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The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." While many decisions have been rendered in trying to
ascertain the exact scope of the protection guaranteed the individual "
thereunder, it was decided at an early date that this privilege against
self-incrimination extended, under the appropriate circumstances, to the
personal papers, as well as to the speech, of the claimant.' Furthermore,
it is not necessary that the claimant be an actual defendant in order to
invoke the privilege. Even though the amendment speaks in terms of any
criminal case, the Supreme Court has held that the ". . . provision must
have a broad construction in favor of the right which it was intended to
secure.Y2 Hence, an individual may assert this privilege if the evidence
sought would tend to incriminate him in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing, or if it would furnish a link in an investigation which might connect
him with a criminal offense.' On this basis, a taxpayer being investigated
by the Internal Revenue Service for a possible criminal violation of the
revenue laws may likewise avail himself of this privilege, and may refuse
to produce or disclose various papers, records and documents which might
tend to be self -incriminating.4
The surprising aspect is not the fact that the privilege exists in favor
of the taxpayer, but that very few cases have squarely faced the question
as to whether this privilege against self-incrimination can be claimed by
one other than the holder thereof when the holder could have done so.
The purpose of this article is to explore this issue with specific reference
to whether an attorney can invoke this privilege for and on behalf of
his taxpayer-client in a criminal tax investigation or case. While the
privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege are
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S., University of Kentucky;
LL.B., University of Louisville; LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan. I would like to
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1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
3. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
4. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); United States v. Judson,
322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
TAX INVESTIGATIONS
often intertwined in tax cases, they are two separate problems; 5 the latter
being beyond the scope of this discussion.'
I. WHERE THE PRIVILEGE CANNOT BE INVOKED
At the outset, it should be firmly held in mind that the sole question
regards the ability of an attorney to invoke the taxpayer-client's privilege
against self-incrimination for and on behalf of the client when he could
have done so himself if present. Therefore, it is obvious that if the client
has no right to the privilege the attorney may not seek to interpose it.7
Neither can it be asserted if the client has previously waived it;8 if the
incriminating evidence or material is not owned by the client;9 nor, if
the evidence sought consists of corporate records to which the privilege
does not apply."° Thus, the following discussion will be limited to those
situations where a valid privilege does in fact exist in favor of an individual
taxpayer.
II. OPPOSING VIEWS
Various statements may be found which embody the principle that
"[t]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a
personal one . . ."" or that "[t]he right of a person under the Fifth
Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege
of the witness." 2 Such forthright pronouncements may not, however,
preclude an attorney from invoking this privilege on behalf of his client,
under the proper set of facts, since they often have reference to the idea
that it may not be asserted by a representative of a nonprivileged orga-
nization such as a corporation or some unincorporated associations on
behalf of those entities.3 A reading out of context may distort the real
meaning of the concept of a "personal privilege."
A. District Court Cases
One of the first tax cases where the issue was unequivocally before
the court was Application of House.'4 Here a proceeding had been in-
stituted to enforce a subpoena requiring the production of certain docu-
5. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) where certain documents
were protected by the attorney-client privilege and other records and papers by the privilege
against self-incrimination although the latter did not come within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.
6. For a good discussion of the attorney-client privilege see Lofts, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 TAx L. REv. 405 (1964).
7. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
8. Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Willis,
145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
9. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1956); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d
383 (6th Cir. 1961).
10. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
11. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
12. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906).
13. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
14. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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ments for examination by the Internal Revenue Service. The papers were
in the possession of the taxpayers' attorneys who refused to deliver them;
one of the contentions being that they were invoking, on behalf of their
taxpayer-clients, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The government cited three cases in support of its position that the
privilege was purely personal to the taxpayers. The court easily distin-
guished them on their facts: one on the grounds that the client had already
waived the privilege prior to its assertion by another; 15 the second because
the attorney was not representing the client at the time he raised the
issue;' 6 and, the third on the basis that the government had previously
validly obtained the records involved before they came into the possession
of the attorney."
The real thrust of the argument advanced by the government was
that unless the taxpayer himself participates in the hearings with the
Internal Revenue Service, he has waived his privilege against self-
incrimination, i.e., it is a privilege that the claimant must assert in person.
The adoption of such a rule would in reality make the taxpayer choose
between attending all of the conferences and hearings or waiving his
privilege. "Such a rule," said the court, "would accomplish nothing except
to impose a heavy penalty in terms of time and money on those taxpayers
who chose to assert their right against self-incrimination under the Con-
stitution."' 8 It then concluded that "[t]he effective exercise of Constitu-
tional rights should not be abridged by any such technical and onerous
requirements as that."'1
This approach is very logical. If the taxpayer should decide to attend
the meetings along with his attorney, it certainly is extremely doubtful
that he would invoke the privilege unless so advised by his attorney. Legal
assistance is the only real factor in the attorney's presence to begin with.
Nor does there appear to be much of a possibility that the client would
refuse to heed the advice of his counsel if it were suggested by him that
the taxpayer assert this privilege. Any supposition to this effect seems
totally unwarranted. If the taxpayer has such confidence in the attorney
that he is willing to permit him to handle the case, or various aspects
thereof, in his absence, he would undoubtedly follow his advice if present.
Not only is this a logical conclusion by the court, but it seems clearly in
line with the earlier statement of the Supreme Court that the privilege
against self-incrimination ". . . must have a broad construction in favor
of the right which it was intended to secure.' '20
15. Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949).
16. United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
17. Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953) where the taxpayer's
accountant obtained the documents from the government on the promise to return them.
Instead he gave them to the taxpayer's attorney who then attempted to assert the privilege.
18. 144 F. Supp. at 100.
19. Id.
20. Counselman v. H-itchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
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The government then advanced the proposition that the records
sought to be subpoenaed were originally produced by the taxpayers'
accountant and that under the applicable state law they belonged to the
accountant and not to the taxpayers. In support of this contention a
state statute was cited which provided that such papers and documents
"shall be and remain the property of such certified public accountant or
public accountant, in the absence of an express agreement to the con-
trary."" In other words, the records were not covered by the privilege
against self-incrimination because they did not "belong" to the taxpayers.
In rebuttal the court noted that "[t]here is no contention by the govern-
ment that taxpayers or their attorneys are not in rightful, indefinite posses-
sion of the documents." 2 For purposes of this case, possession by the
attorneys is equivalent to possession by the clients. Hence, the govern-
ment's position was ". . . reduced to the proposition that the application
of the privilege against self-incrimination turns on the difference between
rightful indefinite possession and legal title.12 The court felt that
"[n]othing in the cases substantiates this notion that a narrow concept
of property law should determine the availability of Constitutional guar-
antees against self-incrimination. 24 While title versus possession may
have some relevancy with regard to the records and documents entitled
to protection under the attorney-client privilege, 5 it should not, in and
of itself, be a bar to the privilege against self-incrimination under the facts
in this case. The court was correct in refusing to be drawn into an analyti-
cal discussion of legal title. Unless the taxpayer had previously disclosed
this information to the investigating authorities, he should still be allowed
to invoke his privilege while the records are in his possession for possible
use in his defense. 6
In United States v. Boccuto27 an opposite result was reached in a
somewhat similar factual situation. The attorney was ordered to produce
certain papers and documents prepared by the taxpayers' accountant.
These records involved both corporate and individual taxpayers. With
regard to the corporate papers, the privilege was unavailable due to its
application to individuals only. 28 The real issue centered around the work
papers of the individual taxpayers.
The court started with the assumption that this case was on "all
fours" with House, but immediately pointed out that there was no evidence
21. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 5130.
22. 144 F. Supp. at 101.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Supra note 6.
26. Even if the government had been correct in its assumption that title was essential
to an assertion of the privilege, the documents had been delivered to the attorney by the
accountant by the express order of the taxpayers. Hence, this would have satisfied the
requirements of the state statute vesting title in the taxpayer.
27. 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959).
28. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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whereby it could be determined whether the inquiry being conducted by
the special agent was of a civil or criminal nature. If the investigation was
civil in nature then the privilege against self-incrimination would have
been unavailable. If it was in fact civil, then House was not the same case
since the taxpayers there were being investigated for the purpose of deter-
mining whether there was a basis for an indictment on a criminal charge.
House clearly involved a criminal investigation. However, it would appear
that the court's confusion over the nature of the investigation was com-
pletely unfounded inasmuch as the inquiry was being made by a special
agent. If the investigation had proceeded to the point where the original
revenue agent had referred the case to the Intelligence Division who in
turn assigned a special agent to continue the investigation, then it was
clearly criminal in nature. Surely the revenue agent had obtained enough
evidence or suspicion to warrant the transfer. The function of the special
agent being to investigate the possibility of a criminal infraction, it seems
obvious that the entire proceedings were no longer civil in nature. The
mere fact that no indictment or accusation might arise as a result of the
work of the special agent can hardly be used as a basis for denying the
tenor of the investigation. The question is not what he discovered nor
what action his superiors might decide to take, but is what he was attempt-
ing to do. In short, he was investigating the possibility of a criminal
infraction. Thus, his questioning could hardly be labeled as civil in nature.
The court then examined the nature of the papers and documents
involved and concluded that they were in fact the property of the accoun-
tant who prepared them and not of the taxpayers. By so doing, it failed
to follow House where that court felt that the privilege against self-
incrimination should not hinge upon some concept of property ownership.
In support of its holding, the court cited authorities to the effect that
there was no accountant-client privilege that would preclude the produc-
tion of an accountant's work papers. 9 While the court's statements might
be true with respect to the accountant-client privilege, neither it nor the
attorney-client privilege was the crucial factor. On the contrary, the
attorney was seeking to invoke his client's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the court concluded ". . . that
the attorney does not, under these circumstances, have the right to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in behalf of his client, and that
the work papers are the property of the accountant and must be produced
in accordance with the summons."" °
In analyzing the decision, it is obvious that the court did not com-
pletely reject the proposition that an attorney may, under certain other
factual situations, raise this privilege for and on behalf of his taxpayer-
client. Rather the court would not permit the privilege to be so raised
29. See Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Sale v. United States,
228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956).
30. 175 F. Supp. at 890.
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where the legal title to the records being sought was in the accountant who
prepared them. Thus the real distinction between Boccuto and House
lies in ownership of the records and the significance attached thereto.
In Boccuto they were the property of the accountant who prepared them,
whereas in House they actually belonged to the taxpayers.8 Even if they
had been the property of the accountant in House, the court's decision
would not have been affected inasmuch as it stated that no ". . . narrow
concept of property law should determine the availability of Constitutional
guarantees against self-incrimination." 2
House went much further in protection of the taxpayer's privilege,
and in light of the nature of a tax investigation by the Intelligence Division
it appears to be the wiser approach. The taxpayer's rights should not be
lost by mere formalities or niceties of property ownership where, for public
policy reasons, one state might see fit to lodge title in the accountant and
another in the taxpayer. In either case, the papers would never have been
prepared by the accountant but for his employment by the taxpayer. Thus
if the papers and documents are of a type that would be covered by the
privilege against self-incrimination if actually owned by the taxpayer, they
should likewise be afforded the protection if they have been prepared by
an accountant at the request of the taxpayer for his benefit.
B. Circuit Court Cases
While the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had at an earlier
date mentioned that an attorney might raise the privilege against self-
incrimination for his client,3 the issue has been directly raised in two
Circuits: in the Eighth Circuit in Bouschor v. United States34 and in the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Judson.3 5 These two cases were decided
within three months of each other.
In Bouscher the workpapers of the taxpayer's accountant and other
documents and records prepared by him were turned over to the tax-
payer's attorney at his (the attorney's) request. The attorney refused
to produce them attempting to assert the client's fifth amendment privi-
lege. The court held that the papers remained the property of the accoun-
tant and, therefore, under Boccuto they were outside of the privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege was a personal one and could not be asserted
by a third party on behalf of the holder thereof. This latter reason was
felt by the court to be sufficient to dispose of the fifth amendment argu-
ment. No elaboration was made.
While the court very summarily disposed of the privilege against
31. See note 26 supra.
32. 144 F. Supp. at 101.
33. Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1957).
34. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
35. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
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self-incrimination as being personal to the taxpayer, one interesting side-
light should be noted. The court mentioned the uncontested fact that
it was the attorney who had requested the papers and records, and that
while this might have been necessary or desirable for the representation
of his client, it could not be used to thwart an investigation by the Internal
Revenue Service. What possible difference should this make with regard
to the client's privilege? Since when does a constitutional right depend
upon the ease with which the investigating or prosecuting agency might
otherwise secure enough evidence to establish its case? Perhaps this
statement might be interpreted to mean that the delivery of the papers
to the attorney could not raise a defense not otherwise available, but
this seems unlikely since the court had previously stated that the privilege
was purely personal in nature. Surely the court did not intend to imply
that the mere fact that the Internal Revenue Service might be forced to
seek evidence elsewhere was sufficient to negate the client's privilege.
Neither was there any indication that the attorney had asked for the
papers for any reason other than to assist him in the preparation of the
client's case. Even if the attorney had asked for them as a delaying
tactic, this would not have affected the client's privilege if one had existed.
The court admits that this was being added for what it was worth.
The problem comes in trying to determine its value.
One of the most important cases affecting the law in this area is
United States v. Judson 6 where the issue was directly before the court.
Virtually every important case and argument previously used by the
Internal Revenue Service was raised and examined. Hence, it will be
discussed in detail.
The taxpayer, upon discovering that he was under investigation by
the Intelligence Division of the Service, retained an attorney to represent
him. The attorney requested a net worth statement and one was prepared
by the taxpayer's accountant. The statement, together with the data used
in preparing it, was delivered to the taxpayer's counsel. Thereafter, the
attorney was served with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to produce
all paid checks and bank statements of the commercial accounts of the
taxpayer at various banks along with all of the work papers, computations
and other accounting work sheets prepared by the firm of accountants
engaged by the taxpayer.
The attorney refused, alleging that the work papers prepared by
the accountants were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The court
agreed since the role of the accountants was to facilitate an accurate and
complete consultation between the attorney and the taxpayer. Without





Far more important to the discussion here were the cancelled checks
and bank statements which were clearly outside the attorney-client privi-
lege. These were items which the taxpayer could not have been compelled
to have produced if he had asserted his privilege against self-incrimination,
but it was undisputed that he had not invoked the application of the fifth
amendment. However, it was asserted by the attorney on behalf of the
taxpayer. The issue was squarely presented to the court.
The main contention of the Service was that the privilege against
self-incrimination is purely personal in nature and cannot be asserted by
any other person in a representative capacity. After reviewing some of
the Supreme Court cases where such statements had been made,37 it was
concluded that that Court had ". . . used the term 'personal' in the sense
of 'natural individual,' and the term 'representative' in the sense of
'representative of a non-privileged organization.' 38 The court acknowl-
edged that it had found no Supreme Court case dealing with the exact
issue, the closest being, in the Court's opinion, one where corporate records
were involved. 9 In that instance, the Court ordered them produced by
the attorney since they could not have been withheld by the client. This
raised an implication, to the court, that a different result might have been
reached if the client possessed the privilege.
It was recognized that there were several decisions containing state-
ments that could be construed in favor of the government's position, but
it was felt that such pronouncements were unnecessary to the decisions
therein rendered. The court distinguished the earlier cases on the basis
that in some of them "the privilege was asserted by an attorney whose
client, the privilege-holder, had waived the benefits thereof"; 40 "the
privilege was asserted by an attorney concerning either 'required' or
'corporate' records, such being outside the scope of the client's privi-
lege"; 4 or, they were "cases in which an attorney asserted the privilege
concerning incriminating matter not owned or possessed by his client. '4 2
In short, the cases cited by the government had one common factual
feature, i.e., the client himself could not have asserted the privilege.
Such was not the case here because it was admitted that the tax-
payer could have personally raised this protective privilege. Instead of
37. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911) ; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
38. 322 F.2d at 464.
39. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
40. 322 F.2d at 464. The cases thus distinguished were Ziegler v. United States, 174
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949) and United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
41. 322 F.2d at 464. The cases noted were Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913);
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); and United States v. Willis, 145
F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
42. 322 F.2d at 465. The cases listed were Remrner v. United States, 205 F.2d 277
(9th Cir. 1953); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1956); and In re
Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961).
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pursuing this course he engaged the services of an attorney, and the court
felt that "[t] he government would have us hold that the taxpayer walked
into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded with the Amendment's
protection, and walked out with something less."" If the taxpayer was
willing to permit the attorney to handle his case, is there any justifiable
reason why he should not be allowed to assert any of the defenses for and
on behalf of his client when it is readily admitted that they could be
raised by the client? The Service would contend that since only the client
knows what will or will not incriminate him, he alone knows whether the
privilege should be raised. This is illogical. The average taxpayer has very
little knowledge of what he can or cannot constitutionally withhold from
the revenue agents. This is his reason for seeking legal assistance in the
first place. The more probable fact is that the taxpayer is far more likely
to divulge incriminating evidence in his eager desire to show that he is
not hiding anything from the investigating authorities. In any event, in
the final analysis it is neither the privilege-holder nor his attorney who
makes the actual determination as to whether he is entitled to the pro-
tection. It is the court. Viewed in this light, is there any basis for denying
to the attorney the ability to raise the defense for his client when he
feels that such a step is appropriate?
The government further contended "... that the evil which the
Fifth Amendment sought to prevent is not present when the prosecution
seeks evidence of A's guilt from B."44 But the court was quick to point
out that any such rationalization ignores the fundamental relationship
between an attorney and his client. The attorney is no mere agent or
representative of his client. The two ". . . are so identical with respect
to the function of the evidence and to the proceedings which call for its
production that any distinction is mere sophistry."45 They are so inter-
twined for purposes of the client's defense that the attorney should be
entitled to raise the defense if the client could do so.
The government then countered that law enforcement would be
needlessly hampered if someone other than the privilege-holder were
ever permitted to assert it. This might possibly be true if the client did
not want the privilege raised, but this was not the question. Granted, no
one specifically asked the taxpayer if he desired to ratify the assertion
made on his behalf. Nevertheless it seems obvious that he wanted the
protection or he would have subsequently given the information being
sought or he would have instructed his attorney to deliver it. His attitude
is exemplified by his conduct and his privilege should be respected even
though not specifically asserted by him. Is it possible that the real concern
of the government was that they desired the taxpayer to voluntarily waive
43. 322 F.2d at 466.




this right, and that they realized that the likelihood of such a course of
action would be substantially reduced through the presence or assistance
of counsel.
The court went on to add that:
Few areas of the law draw so many individuals in contact with
governmental powers as does federal taxation. Yet this branch
is one of the thickest of the law's "bramble bush." The ramifica-
tions of tax law are often a stubborn challenge to the most expert
legal practitioner. The very nature of the tax laws requires tax-
payers to rely upon attorneys, and requires attorneys to rely, in
turn, upon documentary indicia of their clients' financial affairs.
In light of these realities a very real danger would be created if
we were to sustain the government's position.46
It was then concluded that:
The government has at its disposal inquisitorial powers and
administrative procedures which it may invoke at its pleasure.
If the government's position were sustained here, those powers
could be utilized to stimulate a taxpayer's consultation with his
attorney and the predictable transfer of his records. The govern-
ment's powers could then be utilized to compel disclosure of
those matters by the attorney whenever the taxpayer was not
available to utter the magic words. In our judgment, the inherent
power to compel indirectly an individual's self-incrimination is
curbed by the Fifth Amendment as effectively as the power to
compel the same result directly.47
Therefore, once the court in Judson cleared the hurdle of the "per-
sonal privilege" argument it was free to explore the potential results of
the denial of the right of a taxpayer's attorney to assert his client's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. By so doing, the merits of the issue were
considered and the arguments of the government were found wanting.
III. CONCLUSION
At first blush the entire question may seem of relatively little signifi-
cance. Viewed, however, from the standpoint of the individual taxpayer,
it is extremely important and disturbing. He has few alternatives. He may
try to prepare his own defense, a very dubious alternative when it is
remembered that the investigation is of a criminal nature. Secondly, he
can entrust the case to an attorney. If the latter course of action is taken
then he should be able to permit the attorney of his own choosing to
represent him in all aspects including the assertion of his privilege against
self-incrimination when he himself could have raised it if present. Other-
wise, he will be indirectly compelled to attend all hearings, conferences
46. 322 F.2d at 468.
47. Id.
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and discussions which his attorney has with the Internal Revenue Service
for fear that some right or privilege might be waived by his absence. Such
a result places an onerous burden on the individual taxpayer when it could
be done by his attorney. This should not interfere with the investigation
unless the interference be in the sense of requiring them to seek elsewhere
for the evidence which could not be constitionally extracted from the
taxpayer if he were present.
Any fear of the attorney using the privilege when the client would
wish against it is unfounded. The client undoubtedly has complete con-
fidence in the attorney or he would not have selected him. If he should
disagree, the privilege is his and he could subsequently waive it if he so
desired. There is no more danger here than if the taxpayer were present,
for his decision to either avail himself of or waive the privilege will
obviously reflect the thinking of his attorney.
Furthermore, if the Service can secure documents and records from
the attorney which they could not obtain if in the possession of the tax-
payer," chaos would result. The attorney would be unduly hampered in
the preparation of the case. He would not want the documents delivered
to him lest he be served with a subpoena to deliver them as soon as his
client departs. Such a condition is unthinkable. If the privilege is not
permitted to be raised by the attorney, the taxpayer may have in reality
been denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights
under the sixth amendment as well as his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion under the fifth. Surely assistance of counsel would be denied to a
taxpayer if his own attorney was not free to work with the records of the
taxpayer without the threat or danger of the documents being seized by
the prosecuting authorities because they chanced to be in the possession
of the attorney rather than the client. Here again the taxpayer would be
forced to remain in close proximity to the documents.
Hence, the attorney should be able to assert the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination for and on behalf of his taxpayer-client
at any time the privilege exists and could be raised by the taxpayer per-
sonally. Such a rule would not seem to contravene any decision of the
Supreme Court for it appears that its use of the term "personal privilege"
has specific reference to the fact that no individual can assert it on behalf
of an organization to which the privilege is inapplicable. This is borne
out by such statements that "[t]he constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural indi-
viduals."4 9 Thus the concept of the privilege being a personal one should
not prevent the attorney from raising it.
The only possible abuse would be that the attorney might seek to
use this as a delaying tactic, but this danger appears to be outweighed by
48. This has reference to those documents not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
49. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
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the loss that might otherwise be incurred by the taxpayer. The idea of
delay is nothing novel, for it has long been recognized that proceedings are
often drawn out when all constitutional rights are invoked. Protraction of
litigation does not negate constitutional rights.
Lest it be felt that the number of abuses is small and the concern for
the individual taxpayer unwarranted due to the absence of a large number
of cases where the issue has been raised, it might be well to recall a
warning of the Supreme Court. At an early date that Court noted that "it
may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure."5 The only way of preventing this is to adhere
"to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed,"'" for "it is the duty of courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon."5 2 Such a rule should be as zealously
applied in the case of a taxpayer as is presently being done with other
persons being investigated for possible criminal actions or conduct. 3
The taxpayer should be accorded equal protection.
50. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
